Virtue Ethics and Military Leadership

Military leaders cannot avoid making ethical decisions. While this is not controversial, selecting the best method to resolve the ethical problems that confront military leaders sometimes can be. This controversy is made more difficult to resolve because often the military’s ethical values are often in conflict with its non-ethical values. Military culture calls on its members to follow rules and to accomplish missions. A leader is ethically good to the extent he or she follows the rules. A leader is effective to the extent he or she gets things done. Sometimes, however, a leader cannot do both. When the leader cannot do both, the likelihood for ethical crises increases. These crises sap the strength of the military and divert attention of its members and its supporters to things that do not directly relate to ensuring combat readiness. For this reason, a leader’s ability to determine right and wrong is essential to promote and maintain the long-term health of the military.

When leaders attempt to balance the demands of morality with the demands of the profession they typically consider a number of things: their immediate and long term goals, the consequences their decision will have in attaining these goals as well as the effect it will have on others, and the rules and principles that govern the profession. When these conflict, leaders need an approach that will allow them to resolve these conflicts in a consistent and coherent manner. [2] To determine which is the best ethical approach I would like to take a look at three ethical theories that, when taken together, seem to capture most people’s intuitions regarding the ways we think when making ethical decisions. They are rule-centered ethics, utilitarian ethics, and virtue ethics. My aim is to show that the first two approaches are inadequate for ethical decision making and that virtue ethics gives a more complete account. Nevertheless, even though they are inadequate to account for how morally good leaders make decisions, they are essential for describing, in conjunction with virtue ethics, how one is developed.

A platoon was on a rescue mission. Two of their own were trapped on a hill and under fire. Both were seriously wounded and within a few hours would be dead. Between the platoon and the two men was a minefield. The platoon could neither breach it nor go around it and get to the men in time. The platoon leader pondered his options. As he did so, he noticed a civilian walking through the minefield. Making sharp turns for no obvious reason, this person obviously knew where the mines were. The lieutenant had his men detain the civilian in hopes he would voluntarily lead them through the minefield. However, the civilian refused. The lieutenant offers several enticements to get him to cooperate, but the civilian adamantly refuses. There was no way he was going back through that minefield. The LT now was faced with a choice, one he had hoped to avoid. Should he torture or threaten to torture the civilian into cooperating (violating the laws of war), or should he not, and effectively leave his men to die? What was this platoon leader supposed to do? [3]

Before we turn our attention to resolving this problem, we first need to understand the role theory can play in ethical decision making. While military leaders justifiably expect their orders to be obeyed, ultimately they need to have good reasons for giving any particular one. When their orders involve questions of morality, they must have good ethical reasons as well. Leaders who fail to recognize this risk giving arbitrary and conflicting orders. Few people would want to follow such a person.

But for many people ethical theory is too abstract to be useful. They prefer lists of hard and fast rules they can quickly apply especially in tense combat situations. Others trust their intuitions to sort out ethical problems. For these people, theoretical reasoning is detached from the realities of the world they live in and thus of little importance. However, rules can sometimes conflict and intuitions can sometimes be wrong. Thus if leaders are to maintain consistency in their decision making, they will require some kind of approach that will help them sort out the good and bad reasons for any particular act.

This, then, is the role of theory. By giving leaders a means by which they can sort out what kinds of acts are obligatory, prohibited, permissible, and supererogatory, ethical theories provide a coherent framework around which leaders may test their reasons for any act they intend to commit or have their subordinates commit.

Theories, however, do not come without their own sets of difficulties. Some theories determine right and wrong by virtue of the consequence of the act, some by how well the act conforms to a rule about the act, and some by whether the person doing the act possesses the right kind of character. As we shall see in the following discussion, relying on any one of these theories will be inadequate to account for every ethical decision leaders may have to make.

One of the major pitfalls in relying on theory is avoiding the “smorgasbord” approach. When theories are considered in isolation, their shortcomings often compromise their ability to afford leaders good reasons for their decisions. What results usually from this approach is that leaders will conclude that either one theory is as good as another one or that none of them are good for anything. This misses the point of theory.

The point of theory is to enable leaders to think theoretically. It does so by introducing leaders to the “terrain” of ethics and how to navigate this terrain. But just as in complex, arduous terrain one must rely on a number of techniques in order to get where one wants to go, the same is true in ethics. Thus leaders must also avoid the idea that one theory is always preferable to another. Good ethical reasoning requires one to consider moral principles, moral consequences, as well as good character. There is no one way to balance these kinds of considerations. But understanding the pitfalls as well as the insights offered by theories about virtues, principles, and consequences one is in a better position to reason about what kinds of acts are obligatory, prohibited, permissible, and supererogatory.

At this point, we will consider various ethical theories and show how leaders can develop a consistent and comprehensive moral approach based on them.

Utilitarians define the morally right action as that action that maximizes some non-moral good such as pleasure or happiness and minimizes some non-moral evil such as pain or misery. If the lieutenant in the example above were a utilitarian, he might reason that he makes his platoon happy, and the two men on the hill very happy, if he gets the civilian to cooperate, even though that might involve violating the laws of war. He weighs this against the unhappiness the civilian will experience and the unhappiness he may experience if he is ever tried for violating the law and concludes he must do what it takes to get the civilian to cooperate.

But if he is good at utilitarian reasoning he will also consider whether these are the only consequences that could result from this action. If violating the rules in this circumstance undermine the rules in such a way that his soldiers may disregard them in other circumstances (especially when he is not present), the lieutenant must weigh this in his considerations. For instance, he must consider what would happen some time later, his unit is in a village looking for a sniper and some of his men conclude that threatening to shoot a civilian until the villagers turn over the sniper is a good idea. As far as the soldiers are concerned the happiness of the platoon (forty or so people) outweighs the unhappiness of a few civilians. Even though it is clear to the lieutenant that this is faulty reasoning, even from an utilitarian point of view, [4] he must still take this into account when deciding his own course of action. If his decision to torture this civilian opens up these kinds of possibilities, he must consider it as weighing against the happiness that would be experienced. Now he is not so sure that torturing or threatening to torture the civilian is a good idea. The problem he has is that both possible outcomes are just as likely. It seems he is in a dilemma.

This then is just one of the criticisms we may offer against utilitarian reasoning. Because it is impossible, particularly in complex situations found on modern battlefields, to know the consequences of any particular act. [5] If it is not possible to know with at least some degree of precision the consequences of any particular act, then it is not possible to rely on utilitarian thinking to provide ethical guidance.

The lieutenant may, with some justification, point out that he does not need to consider the happiness of any particular non-combatant or soldier and instead appeal directly to considerations of military necessity. He may reason that since his cause his just, which we will presume for the sake of argument, [6] happiness will be maximized if it is achieved. Since this includes minimizing the risks to soldiers so that they may continue the war effort, any course of action which directly contributes to mission accomplish or reduces risk to soldiers will be morally justifiable. In fact, such acts will be morally obligatory, regardless of what that action is. If this were true, then the lieutenant would be free to disregard the laws of war and torture the civilian. In fact, if this were true, he would never have to consider the laws of war in the first place.

This, then, is one of the problems of using military necessity as the sole moral criteria for evaluating the ethics of any particular course of action: it renders the law of war as well as any other moral consideration meaningless.

One may reasonably ask, in light of this fact, why one should consider the law and morality of war as more important than military necessity. The are a number of reasons. First, by signing treaties such as the Geneva and Hague Conventions, governments, as well as the soldiers who act on their behalf, have a prima facie obligation to uphold its tenets. Treating making is a kind of promise making, and while it may be permissible to sometimes break promises, [7] there have to be compelling moral reasons for doing so.

One may argue that winning a war is one such a reason. In fact, given a just cause, soldiers are morally obligated to do all they can to win battles. However, if we accept that as the only consideration, then treaty making, at least in the context of the law of war, would be rendered meaningless. There would never be any good reason for expecting that the other side will uphold its provisions.

If there is no reason to expect the other side will uphold the provisions of a treaty, there is no reason to enter into that treaty in the first place. Since these kinds of treaties are essential to the avoidance of war, and failing that limiting the misery caused by war, they are morally preferable to the alternative. Thus, we cannot accept that military necessity is the sole ethical criteria for decisions made in combat and that we are obligated to keep our promises at the same time.

Now it is not the case that it is never permissible for a nation to unilaterally to break treaty provisions, even given the risks such an act poses to that nation’s ability to continue to make treaties. However, the problem for soldiers in the case of the law of war is that they are bound by these treaties by virtue of their obligation to uphold all lawful orders. In the case of many militaries around the world, [8] this includes adhering to the law of war. Thus if military necessity were the only morally binding consideration, soldiers would often find themselves in the position of having to violate a lawful order in order to conform to the requirements of military necessity. Given the importance of obedience to lawful orders to the ability of the military to fulfill its moral obligation of doing everything it can to win just wars, it then cannot be reasonable to accept military necessity as the sole moral criteria by which to judge courses of action. Thus, the corrupting effect of relying on purely utilitarian considerations forces good soldiers to consider other moral claims.

One such claim is that it is not morally permissible to intentionally kill innocent people. Outside the context of war, people who do so are murderers and are subject to incarceration and in some places, execution. However, in the context of war, military necessity would render this principle meaningless, since no kinds of actions are morally prohibited, only kinds of consequences. But for us to be consistent, we have to give reasons why in war the prohibition against intentionally taking innocent lives is no longer binding.

To illustrate why this is problematic consider the following example. Many people will agree that a deadly disease, such as AIDS, represents a great evil. They would also agree that curing that disease would represent a great good. But many would not accept that it would be permissible to experiment on people without their consent using a drug that could have serious side effects, even if it were the most expedient way to cure the disease. To do so, would be treating these people morel like lab rats than human beings and thus would constitute a gross violation of their human dignity.

This then is what is so troubling about relying on military necessity as the sole criteria for ethically evaluating courses of action in combat. It requires that we disregard the dignity and respect owed to every innocent human being. Since preserving this dignity and the rights associated with it are fundamental to the cause democratic nations should be fighting for, it is impossible to consistently apply military necessity as a moral criteria in all situations. This is not to say that it should not ever be considered—given a just cause, soldiers do have an obligation to win—but it cannot be the only consideration without risking corrupting the justice of the cause on is fighting for.

If the lieutenant in our example were following a rule or duty-based ethics, further difficulties await him. Which rule does he follow? One set of rules makes it clear that he may do nothing to hurt the man in his custody, whether he is a civilian or a guerrilla. [10] By being in his custody, this man is a non-combatant and is protected by the war convention. But another set of rules, the ones he learned in his first officer training courses, tell him he must always take care of his soldiers and that he must always accomplish the mission. [11]

It is not clear in this case, which rules take precedence. We might say that the war convention, at least as it has taken the form of international treaty, takes precedence over any rules or duties imposed by the military, specified or implied. In fact, our story might just end here because the military has done something much like this. The obligation to uphold the tenets of the war convention does take precedence over any order or rule imposed solely by the military. According to the war convention, soldiers take risks that non-combatants do not. When there is a choice like the one our lieutenant is facing, he must decide in favor of the non-combatant; even if that means his soldiers will likely die. But our story does not end here. There are problems with forming and implementing rule based ethical systems that leave our lieutenant in much the same quandary he would be in if he only employed a utilitarian one.

In a rule or duty-based approach, doing as required is good in itself. We cannot know the moral status of any state of affairs without some account of how it came to be. If it was achieved by complying with the rules it was right, if it was achieved by violating the rules, it was wrong. For the most part this makes a great deal of sense. In combat, there is little time for reflection and rules provide something solid and easily accessible in the confusion of battle. Also, where there is a great deal of incentive to do the wrong thing, a well developed sense of duty based on well justified rules and principles can provide the motivation to avoid doing it. Rules give leaders something to fall back on when the idea of “right” might not seem clear. They provide boundaries and a framework within which to perform the functions of leadership. However, sometimes these boundaries overlap and rules conflict. The result is ethical dilemmas that cannot be resolved without appealing to something outside the rule system.

Ultimately, rules are inadequate to provide ethical guidance for two reasons. First, they do not account for everything that lies within the realm of ethics. Second, even if they could, systems of rules tend to be either too specific or too general to provide adequate guidance for the leader trying to decide what is right and what is wrong.

In the case of our lieutenant, one of his problems lies in the fact that rules do not account for everything that lies within the sphere of the ethical. Rule based systems, while they may be good at guiding and motivating us not to do wrong, usually are not very good at guiding and motivating us to do right. Rules and duties often come with sanctions. If one fails to follow the rule or do one’s duty, one experiences the sanction; whether that be a jail term, letter of reprimand, community service, etc. However, this does not motivate us to do good. An ethical code or rule book is not going to help the leader in question always figure out what the right thing to do is. Yet, figuring out what is the right thing to do is at the very heart of good leadership. A good leader leads people to do good things. Thus the ethical approach to leadership we want is one such that, if leaders follow it, they will not only gain an understanding of how to lead people to do good things, but also an understanding of what those good things look like. Any example that draws distinctions like bureaucrat vs. leader, or legal vs. moral will serve to illustrate.

To illustrate this point, consider the following example. In many militaries, it is a generally accepted rule that officers and non-commissioned officers have an obligation to care for their soldiers. In order to give some clear guidelines on how to do that, a general I know once made the rule that the officer’s place is at the front of the mess line, ensuring that everyone gets fed, and then eats last, after everyone one of his soldiers have been fed.

One time, this general found a lieutenant under his command at the end of the line, a situation he quickly corrected. [12] The lieutenant did not make that mistake again. Now, initially, as the lieutenant stands at the head of a line, he is simply following a rule. If rules were the sole determinants of right and wrong, then the lieutenant has done right. This is good as far as it goes, but what this rule does not tell him is what he must do while standing at the head of the line.

This is because ethical rules can only regulate actions. However, we affect others not only through what we do but also by what we feel and what attitudes we adopt toward them. But feelings and attitudes (which are, in a large part, functions of our personality) cannot be exclusively regulated by rules.

This is because feelings and attitudes describe a state of being. It makes no sense to say that someone is in a state [13] in accordance with a rule, or that someone is in a state by following a rule; though it does make sense to say that someone got himself to be in a state by following a rule. For example, can you make a rule to be healthy? If you do, what can you say to someone who gets sick? If you say, “Do not be unhealthy!” you are not really forming a rule, but making an exhortation. So even if we create rules and duties requiring people to act with integrity, or to be generous, or to lead, we do not really give the potential leader a coherent system on which he or she can base decisions. This is because rules cannot cover states and feelings. Nonetheless, these states and feelings do affect our attitudes toward other human beings. Since our attitudes affect how we treat other human beings, they also affect these others’ welfare. Since our attitudes affect the welfare of others, they are within the sphere of the ethical. But since they cannot be governed by rules, ethical theories that rely on rules are going to be inadequate to describing and prescribing ethical behavior.

Now one response to this would be to point out that the general in this example could have made more rules in order to completely account for all the actions that fall under principle of caring for ones’ soldiers. In addition to a rule about standing at the head of a line, he could also have rules about what to do while the lieutenant is standing there. He could tell him to check the quality of food, the quantity served each soldier, and so on. But this brings us to another problem associated with rule-based systems.

In an effort to provide clear guidance, rules get constructed to account for every possible circumstance. The result is more opportunities for conflict arise and the rule system itself becomes so large no one could possibly know them all. This does not mean one should never rely on rules. It may be possible to construct a reasonably sized body of rules for what the lieutenant should do while at the head of the mess line as well as a number of other situations. But one only needs to look at the manuals on the laws of war (such as FM 27-10) or the ROE for a peacekeeping mission to see the difficulties in relying exclusively on a rules based approach.

The response then is to make the rules general in order to cover a variety of different situations. The problem here is that they often become too general to provide any real guidance in real-life situations. One response to this kind of problem would be to make the rules more general in order to apply to a variety of situations. We might say things like, “Always care for your troops, remain impartial, make sound and timely decisions.” If all I have is the rule, “always care for your troops” I do not have clear guidance on what I should or should not do. Could I also not make the case that obeying the laws does constitute caring for my troops if it precludes the unfortunate consequences that I discussed above? Here, the rules become too vague and abstract to provide any real guidance in complicated situations met in everyday dilemmas.

The strength then of a rule-based approach rests on how it can perform a number of balancing acts, for example, the balancing act between being too rigid and too general and between avoiding wrong and doing right. If it tries to do both, it becomes unwieldy and ends up being a source of dilemmas rather than a method for resolving dilemmas. But, even if it does manage to achieve some sort of balance, it still cannot give us a complete account of everything that lies within the sphere of the ethical.

Neither utilitarian nor rule-based theories provide the lieutenant with adequate guidance on what he should do in every situation. Even if they did, there is nothing inherent in them, as moral approaches, which will motivate the lieutenant to choose the course of action they prescribe, especially when it conflicts with his desires. What the lieutenant will do will ultimately depend on the kind of person the lieutenant is.

For this reason it becomes important to develop leaders of character who understand what it means to be a good leader, not just what it means to follow rules, perform duties, or even to reason well, though these are important to being an ethically good leader. If we are going to provide leaders with the resources necessary to make ethically good decisions, especially in tough situations, as well as develop good leaders among subordinates, it is important to construct an approach to ethics that will tell us what good character is and how it can be developed.

Virtuous people are more concerned with being the kind of people who do the right thing at the right time and in the right way and are not as concerned with the act itself. Virtue ethics avoids most dilemmas because the focus is no longer on deciding between two unfortunate outcomes or two conflicting rules, but on being a certain kind of person. Virtuous leaders do not assign values to outcomes or preferences to duties. Virtuous leaders have habituated dispositions that make them the kind of people who do the right thing, even in the complicated and dynamic environment of modern military operations.

To get a deeper understanding of what virtue is, that is exactly what it is we expect the leader to cultivate, we can return to our previous example about caring. As the lieutenant stands at the head of a line, he is simply following a rule. But if he knows this rule is supposed to make him a more caring person he should begin to notice things. For example, the cooks may be giving out unusually small portions, the food is not cooked as well as it should or could be, or there is a lack of variety from day to day. Now there is nothing in the rule that requires him to do anything about these things. His only requirements are to stand at the head of the line and make sure everyone gets fed before he does. As noted before, the general could make rules about each of these things, but this will not guarantee that he has made a rule about every relevant thing. And, as noted before, there are problems with even trying.

But, since he knows that this rule is supposed to make him a more caring person toward his soldiers, he is motivated to act to correct these things. This may seem like a simple and inconsequential example, but I think this same dynamic works in a great many situations. At first, the junior officer is following rules, but later, after doing it long enough with a properly critical and creative attitude, he makes a transition to where he is actually disposed to be caring. Once this happens, this person is no longer simply following rules. What motivates him to adopt this attitude is an understand that it is not enough to do good, it is just as important to be good.

If rules are going to have a role in habituating virtue, it is critical that the person making the rules possess the virtue. In this way the rules are not arbitrary, but instead become a sort of “path” the junior leader follows to become a good leader. This leads us to the notion of mentorship. Aristotle likened the acquiring of virtues to playing an instrument. It requires both practice and a teacher. One does not pick up a guitar and by fooling around with it, figure out how to play it. One might, after a fashion, be able to make pleasant sounds with it. But without someone to provide an example, getting to that point will be long and arduous, fraught with mistakes, and at the very least, certainly not efficient. One might even pick up a book and learn the principles of good guitar playing. But for those who have tried that method, know that will make them better to an extent, but it takes a good teacher to really allow them to achieve excellence.

Thus to acquire the virtues necessary to be a good leader, we must introduce the notion of the ‘role model.’ Junior, or would-be leaders need to see how the virtues are instantiated by those who are effective at moral leadership. Only then will they learn how to effectively habituate these virtues into their own lives.

Virtues involve a delicate balancing between general rules and an awareness of particulars. In this process, the perception of the particular takes priority. It takes priority in the sense that a good rule is a good summary of wise particular choices, and not a court of last resort. Employing our health analogy again, the rules of ethics, like rules of medicine, should be held open to modification in the light of new circumstances. The good leader must therefore cultivate the ability to perceive and correctly and accurately describe his situation and include in this perceptual grasp even those features of the situation that are not covered under the existing rule. The virtues provide a framework around which leaders may engage in this process.

Unlike a rule based approach to leadership and leadership development which emphasizes “doing,” a virtue ethics approach focuses on developing character traits which lead to “being” a good leader. To become a good leader, you must acquire and exercise those virtues or character traits that make you so.

In virtue ethics, the virtues are determined by understanding what it means for human beings to function well. [14] Once one knows to function well one can determine which character traits one should instantiate. One might think of it this way; a pack animal, like a mule, must have certain characteristics for it to be a good mule. We know what those characteristics are because we know what the function of a mule is. If the function of a mule is to bear burdens, it must have traits like strength, surefootedness, and endurance to do that well. The greater the degree a mule possesses these traits, the better a mule it is.

A human being must also have certain characteristics to be a good human being. However, since what it means to function well for a human is a much more complex subject than what it means to function well for a mule, it is difficult to articulate. Part of the problem is that what it means to function well is often determined by culture. If this were entirely the case, then virtue ethics becomes nothing more than a sophisticated version of ethical relativism. This is, in fact, a major shortcoming in virtue ethics. The failure to be able to articulate a ‘correct’ view of human functioning has led many to reject the whole idea of virtue ethics as a viable ethical approach.

But in organizations, such as the military, that have a strong sense of tradition and community, we can determine what it means to flourish because we can determine what it means to function well. This does not quite solve the problem of determining an objective account of human flourishing, but it does give us objective grounds for justifying the moral traits of the good military leader.

This is not enough, however, to give a moral account of leadership. It is possible to be in an organization or fulfill a role that serves no moral purpose. Take a carpenter for example. We know, by virtue of the function of a carpenter, what the good traits of a carpenter are. However, whether or not any particular carpenter should instantiate those traits on any particular occasion depends on whether or not the carpenter wants to produce a quality piece of woodworking.

This is what sets professions apart from occupations. People who have an occupation, only have an obligation to themselves. This may extend to others when they enter into contracts to produce certain goods or services, but they have no obligation to enter into such contracts. This is not true for members of a profession. For example, doctors are obligated to heal the sick, regardless of their feelings about it in any given instance. Similarly, soldiers have an obligation to come to the defense of their nation regardless of their desires about any particular war. This is because in both cases, members of these professions are serving moral ends. In the case of doctors, it is the obligation to help those in need and relieve suffering. In the case of the military it is assisting the state in its obligation to provide for the defense of its citizens.

So given a morally justified purpose, attempting to instantiate the traits necessary to fulfill that purpose becomes a moral obligation. Thus here we may introduce the idea of special virtues to illustrate how a virtue ethics approach to leadership might work in the context of the military profession.

If, in the context of this tradition we decide that something is itself a good end, like leadership, we can adopt special virtues that will help us realize that end. Just like we know the mule must have strength and endurance, the leader must have character traits, for example, such as integrity and courage. Special virtues then become the means by which we instantiate this good end. Becoming a good leader does not consist merely in learning and keeping principles, but in developing one’s character by practicing certain sorts of behavior until they become habitual; that is, part of one’s character.

I have made the claim that, as an ethical theory, virtue ethics better accounts for good leadership than either utilitarianism or rule-based systems. It does so because when a leader is faced with the kind of situation I described in the beginning of the paper it is the virtues that the leader has habituated that are going to guide his or her actions. This is not to say that leaders could not find themselves in situations where any course of action yields a morally impermissible result. Nor is it to say that a virtuous leader does not ever appeal to utility or rules to determine what the right answer is. The point is that the virtuous leader has developed the disposition to know how and when to do that in the best way possible.

What the virtuous lieutenant will understand is that he cannot instantiate one virtue, such as caring, by failing to instantiate another virtue, such as integrity. In any particular situation, the virtuous person acts in such a way that all the relevant virtues are instantiated. For example, the lieutenant might decide that it is better to maximize the happiness of his men at the expense of fulfilling his duty to obey lawful orders. But he will understand that he can not be caring at the expense of his integrity. He will understand that somehow he must maintain or restore it. He will understand that to be virtuous, he must take responsibility for his actions and the bad consequences those actions might have. So to prevent or mitigate the bad consequences he might turn himself over to his superiors or resign from his position and take responsibility for his action. This would send the message to his subordinates that what he did may have been necessary, but it was not good. One of the consequences of utilitarianism is that the lieutenant would actually be able to conclude that torturing the civilian was a morally obligated act if he concluded that rescuing his men maximized military necessity. Virtue ethics allows him to conclude that this may be the morally best course of action, but not that the results of the action are morally good.

Could the lieutenant be virtuous and let his men die? Only if there was a way to instantiate caring if he does so. However, rule based ethics would force him to conclude that letting his men die is the right thing to do.

I hesitate to offer a definitive ‘virtuous’ solution because there really is not one, at least not in the same sense that utilitarianism or rule-based systems offer one. These approaches attempt to determine what the right action is in a particular situation. They are intended to be ‘formulas’ that when all of the relevant variables are put into the equation, the ‘right’ answer pops out. However, as we have shown, they are not always up to the challenge. Virtue ethics does not offer a formula, but instead offers a way of developing ourselves and our subordinates in a manner that gives us all a wide variety of resources to draw on to make the best, in the ethical sense, decision possible. Rather than determining what the right action is in any given situation, virtue ethics determines that the right thing to do is become a virtuous person.

This is the strength of virtue ethics as an ethical framework for leadership. Virtue ethics recognizes that good people can be put into difficult situations where any outcome has ethically bad consequences. Acting in such a situation, however, would not necessarily make someone a bad person, though repeatedly doing so almost certainly would. Rightness or wrongness is determined by the kind of person one is, not simply by the consequences of the acts one commits. Actions may be evidence of virtue (or a lack of virtue), but they are not in themselves virtuous.

Using virtue ethics to analyze and inculcate leadership also allows us to distinguish between the vicious, bad, poor, fair, good, excellent, outstanding, and/or inspirational leader in ways the other approaches do not. Utilitarian and rule based systems do not as easily lend themselves to such distinctions and seem wholly incapable of capturing conceptions like an "insensitive" or "inspirational" leader. When we describe the good leader it is not enough to say that he or she always does his or her duty. That is something we can say of most followers as well. It also seems inadequate to say someone is a good leader simply because he or she is able to maximize happiness and minimize misery better than others. There is much more to being a good leader than duty and consequences and the virtue approach allows us to explore and articulate this in ways other approaches do not.

However, we are still left with some unresolved issues. While virtue ethics has advantages over other approaches, I have not discussed in enough detail what the virtues of good leadership are nor have I discussed in sufficient detail the difficult and complex task of acquiring these virtues. I have discussed that they come from habituation and role modeling, but in the practical matter of teaching it, I have not described a compelling account of how to ensure that we do not slip back into rule-based methods. In order to teach integrity, we might tell someone to always tell the truth, never tell a lie, do what you promise. But if all we tell people is that if they adhere to these rules long enough and often enough they will become habit, this will put us right back where we started. Similar problems exist for the other virtues as well. How do we teach someone to be virtuous? It is not enough to say that it takes experience. We have to understand what kind of experience it takes, and then devise means for those who would lead to obtain it.

Using virtue ethics to analyze and inculcate leadership allows us to distinguish between the vicious, bad, poor, fair, good, excellent, outstanding, and inspirational leader in ways the other theories do not. Utilitarian and rule based systems do not as easily lend themselves to such distinctions and seem wholly incapable of capturing conceptions like an "insensitive" or "inspirational" leader. When we describe the good leader it is not enough to say that he or she always does his or her duty. That is something we can say of most followers as well. It is also inadequate to say someone is a good leader simply because he or she is able to maximize happiness and minimize misery better than others do. There is much more to being a good leader than duty and consequences and the virtue approach allows us to explore and articulate this in ways the others do not.

[2] For a discussion on the importance of consistency and coherence in ethical decision making, see Don Snider, Major John Nagl, and Major Tony Pfaff Army Professionalism, The Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century Carlisle, PA, The Strategic Studies Institute, 1999.

[3] This dilemma is based on an actual event that occurred during the Vietnam War. See Anthony E. Hartle, Moral Issues in Military Decision Making, (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1989) 2-3.

[4] In this example the soldiers have failed to take into account the unhappiness of the village as a whole and even their own unhappiness if this makes the village more resistant to them and more likely to help the enemy in the future. Also, utilitarians consider the amount of happiness or unhappiness someone feels as being relevant. In this case the soldiers happiness probably does not exceed the unhappiness experienced by the villagers, even if there are just as many villagers as soldiers.

[5] For a description on why it is impossible to know the consequences of any particular act on the battlefield see, Pfaff, Charles A. “Chaos, Complexity, and the Modern Battlefield,” Military Review, July-August, 2000.

[6] Walzer argues that in most cases all soldiers may presume their cause is just. This doctrine, known as “invincible ignorance” claims that since soldiers only know what their leaders tell them regarding the reasons for going to war, and since in most cases leaders portray the cause as just, soldiers may reasonably conclude that the cause is therefore just. Furthermore, while opposing sides in a war may fight for an unjust cause, it is not the case that opposing sides may both fight for a just cause. The just cause of war is responding to aggression, against one’s own nation or another’s. This means that in every just war, one side must have committed an act of aggression and be fighting for an unjust cause. Thus it is reasonable for soldiers to presume that not only is their cause just, but that the enemy’s is unjust. While this may not in fact be the case since their leaders may be lying to them, it is reasonable in most cases for soldiers to proceed as though it is. Only when leaders portray the cause as unjust will this change. Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977, pp 127-128.

[7] This is illustrated by the following example: suppose you make a promise to meet a friend for lunch. On your way there you come across a serious automobile accident. Since you are the only one around who can help, you have to decide if the obligation to keep your promise to your friend is more important than your obligation to help those in need. Clearly in this case it is permissible to not go to lunch with your friend in order to help the victims of the accident.

[9] I am avoiding criticizing meta-ethical theories that attempt to offer us a way to determine the rules, principles, and duties to which we should adhere. These theories try to show that if we know what the rule generating principle is, we can know what the rules are. There would be no need to memorize long lists or interpret abstract principles. Since these meta-ethical theories are typically not what we give leaders, I think it more relevant to discuss the problems associated with rules we do give them.

[11] For example see the Principles of Leadership in Chapter 2 of FM 22-100 (Military Leadership) Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 31 July 1990 (http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/22-100/PAR1CH2.HTM)

[13] The notion of ‘state’ can refer to both physical and mental conditions and sometimes it will be hard to separate the two since our physical states can affect our mental states and vice versa. When I refer to states for the purpose of ethical analysis, I am referring to the feelings, attitudes, personality traits, etc that we experience at any given moment in time.

United States Military Observer Detachment-Kuwait

APO AE 09889