Ethics and the War on Terrorism

Shortly after the attacks of 11 September, I found myself standing on a mound of dirt on the Kuwaiti side of the DMZ, looking into Iraq. As I looked across into the Iraqi town of Safwan, the dogs on the Iraqi side started barking. As they barked, dogs on the on the Kuwaiti side started coming from various directions and hidden places. They formed a pack and headed right for me, barking the whole time. They climbed the mound and formed a line, evenly spaced about ten feet apart. They kept barking. This continued for several minutes.

Even though no one else was around, it took me a few minutes to realize they were barking at me. I stared at them incredulously for a few minutes and then climbed off the mound. The lead dog came over to where I was standing and sniffed around, as if to make sure I was really gone, but the pack did not stop barking until I returned to my car and drove away. I am not exactly sure why I warranted such a reaction, but I suppose that the last time they saw Americans at the border was a little unnerving for them.

The world is nervous about what America is going to do next. Its leaders have an obligation to preserve the lives and well being of its citizens, so they must respond to this threat. [1] But it is not entirely clear how they are to proceed. Many characterize this as a war of the big against the small, the strong against the weak. Yet it is not clear whom, in this case, the strong and the weak really are. Clearly, the US has far superior military forces than the Al Qaeda network and its supporters, like the Taliban. And while application of this force can do a great deal of harm to the adversary, it is not clear that it can defeat it.

Furthermore, it is not clear that in spite of its strength, the US itself is immune from defeat by this new kind of enemy. [2] Technology has greatly increased the effectiveness of weapons and the speed and distance over which forces can move and communicate. Additionally, globalization has made many nations of the world vulnerable in ways they had not been before. More powerful weapons, better global communication systems, and increased opportunities to divert non-weapon technologies to destructive ends has dramatically increased the ability of small groups to achieve their goals, regardless of the political support they may have. [3] Before, the power to wage war on a nation rested solely in the hands of other nations. Now it can also rest in the hands of a few dozen highly motivated people with cell phones and access to the Internet.

Thus, while those who are waging the war against terrorism must wrestle with the practical issues, they must wrestle with the ethical ones as well. Not only will they need to make changes in doctrine and weapon systems; they will also need to reconsider the ethics of their application. This does not necessarily mean this application must be more restrained if it is to be moral, but it does mean that leaders in the United States must consider the dignity and well-being of others before proceeding.

Military ethics derives from the answers to two kinds of questions. The first is the jus ad bellum question: is it permissible to violate a nation's political sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to pursue these terrorists? The second is the related jus in bello question regarding how much force is permissible when engaging the terrorists and their supporters.

How you answer these questions depends on the nature of the adversary. For many, the terrorists are criminals, albeit very lethal ones. For others, they are enemies, who represent, in the words of political philosopher Carl Schmitt, the negation of one’s own way of life. These distinctions are important to determining our moral obligations. One pursues criminals within the confines of law and never in a way that violates the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation. Furthermore, one may never pursue criminals in such a way that innocents will knowingly be harmed. And one may not incarcerate criminals, or otherwise punish them, unless a court of law has found them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [4]

This is not true in war. In war, one may kill the enemy without warning. Furthermore, one may engage the enemy even if by doing so civilians will be harmed, though this harm must be limited. Furthermore, one may incarcerate enemy soldiers only as long as the hostilities last. When the war is over, they must be repatriated. Soldiers are not guilty of the crime of war, and while they bear its risks, they do not morally bear any blame. Thus punishing them makes no sense.

Yet the US and its allies have fought the terrorists as though they were both. They have bombed sovereign nations and killed civilians in the process. Yet when they capture members of the Al Qaeda, they refer to them as criminals and refuse to grant them the status of prisoner of war. Thus either we must understand these terrorists as a new category of threat for which we must reconsider our old ethical beliefs, OR pursue them as criminals and risk being ineffective OR pursue them as enemies and risk being unjust.

This is not the first time the US has used military force against criminals, nor is it the first time it has pursued them outside its borders. The War on Drugs, like the War on Terrorism, is fought using military forces against small, well-organized, and well-resourced groups that operate in a variety of nations. However, in the War against Drugs, the US military only operates outside its borders in international waters or with permissions of sovereign nations where drugs are grown and smuggled. In the War on Terrorism, however, President Bush has made it clear that the United States reserves the right to violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of any nation in pursuit of the terrorists.

Furthermore, when pursuing the War on Drugs, US forces only use deadly force against drug smugglers when they are in the act of producing or smuggling drugs. Even, then efforts are made to apprehend them if possible and bring them to trial. US forces rarely, if ever act in such a way that does not meet with the approval of the government of the nation they are operating in, and they rarely, if ever, act in such a way that people not involved in drug smuggling will knowingly be harmed. This has not been true of the US’s War on Terrorism.

There are good reasons for this difference. Ethical obligations, permissions, and prohibitions differ when one is fighting wars from when one is pursuing criminals. In a just war, a nation is permitted to violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation in response to an act of aggression, either against itself or another nation, or to prevent a humanitarian disaster. An act of aggression is, in the words of political philosopher Michael Walzer, the crime of war, and once committed represents a destruction of peace. It is this act that turns competitors into enemies, a relationship that represents the class of people it is permissible to kill. To restore a just peace, which is the only morally appropriate aim of the use of force, members of the military may use as much deadly force as is permissible given the restrictions of the law and morality of war.

To understand the importance of this point, it is important to note the special theoretical sense the notion enemy has here. The political philosopher Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) once pointed out that all forms of competition can be divided into various categories, for example: moral, economic, aesthetic and political. These forms are then further divided into categories that capture the nature of the rivalries they describe. For example, morality distinguishes between good and evil, aesthetic distinguishes between the beautiful and the ugly, and economics distinguishes between profitable and unprofitable. Politics distinguishes between friend and enemy. It is in the last category that the possibility for violent conflict arises. As Schmitt states, “There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program no matter how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could justify men in killing each other for this reason.” [5]

In this sense, the enemy does not simply mean the “other” with whom there is some dispute. Rather, the enemy relationship describes the most intense degree of separation groups can have. [6] Furthermore, in this sense the enemy is public not private. As Schmitt says, “An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy.” [7] Once this separation is total, the enemy becomes an unmitigated threat, and the negation of the enemy is seen as fundamental to preserving one’s own way of life and to preserve this way of life, the enemy must be eliminated.

Though the enemy may represent a negation of one’s way of life that does not necessarily mean any resort to force is justified. In accordance with Just War Theory, an enemy may only be attacked in response to an act of aggression. [8] Thus it would have been impermissible for the US to attack the Soviet Union during the Cold War simply because they were enemies. Thus one may know one’s enemies by their intent, but one may not attack them until they try to realize that intent by attacking. Then it is permissible to violate their political sovereignty and territorial integrity in return.

Though wars are fought against enemies, there are still moral restraints on how much force soldiers are permitted to use. But for the most part these restraints are only aimed at persons who do not represent a threat. There are few restraints aimed at persons who do represent a threat. Those restraints that do exist, exist because according to the law and morality of war, soldiers are not guilty of the crime of war. Thus it is permissible to kill them to eliminate the threat, but not permissible to make them suffer unnecessarily in the course of doing so.

When soldiers consider how to accomplish their ends, they are legally, morally, and pragmatically obligated to consider how much force to use. [9] As a general rule of thumb, the more indirect and long range direct fire soldiers can put on an objective is inversely proportional to the amount of resistance they will experience when they try to take the objective. The less the resistance, the less the cost in friendly soldiers’ lives necessary. Thus, the more force soldiers apply, the less risk they have to take in order to accomplish their missions. Viewed this way, what soldiers understand as the amount of force necessary is that which reduces risks to soldiers the most. Sometimes, however, the application of this force endangers non-combatant lives and property. Because of this, soldiers must also ask how much force should they apply.

In order to limit the misery caused by war, the law and morality of war attempt to answer the question of “how much” by requiring soldiers to consider certain rules, principles, and consequences that may restrain the amount of force they may apply. [10] To determine how much force they should use against an enemy, soldiers must temper their judgements not only with the pragmatic concern of how much is practical, but also with the moral and legal concern of protecting non-combatant lives and property. A commander may be able, with a high degree of accuracy, to place a single bomb in a specific building, but he cannot always be sure how many civilian lives will be lost if he does so. And though there is nothing in the law or morality of war that absolutely prohibits him from doing so, he is morally and legally required to take into account the due care he owes civilians when deciding how much and what kind of force he will use.

Often, this means limiting the amount of force soldiers may want to apply and this will correspondingly raise the amount of risk soldiers will have to take. Thus there is a tension between the amount of due care commanders owe non-combatants and the amount of due risk they and their soldiers are expected to take in order to accomplish military missions. [11] Since lowering risks to soldiers is also closely associated with increasing the likelihood of overall success, soldiers and their leaders experience the need to keep risks at a minimum as a moral imperative of considerable force.

Given the logic of warfare, it is always in the commander’s interest to place as much force as is morally and legally permissible on any particular objective in order to preserve soldiers’ lives. This means when commanders and their soldiers determine what is necessary, they are always asking themselves how much force is allowable, not how little is possible. What is necessary when resolving the tension between due care and due risk is minimizing risk, not force. The most force allowable then becomes the necessary force since it is what is necessary to preserve soldiers’ lives without violating the law or morality of war.

Soldiers, however, may not completely minimize their risk if by doing so they increase the risk to noncombatants. By virtue of their role, soldiers agree to accept risks that noncombatants do not, regardless of their nationality. However, even this obligation is limited. If it were not, then it would be possible for the enemy to use civilians as shields and render it impossible to prosecute the war in a moral fashion. [12] Thus, soldiers are not obligated to take so much risk that the mission will fail, nor are they obligated to take so much risk it is certain their unit will not be able to continue the war effort. [13]

Since the amount of risk soldiers are obligated to take is limited, it is then permissible for them to engage in courses of action in which civilians may knowingly, though unintentionally be harmed. This last distinction is important and is what separates acts of terror from legitimate uses of force in war. But even this has its limits and these limits are captured by the doctrine of double effect, one of the more restrictive features of the Just War Tradition.

The doctrine of double effect was first formulated by St. Thomas Aquinas as a response to St. Augustine’s moral prohibition against self-defense. [14] This doctrine results from the recognition that in pursuit of a moral good, like self-defense, there may be unintended, but foreseeable, moral harms. Thus, according to this doctrine, it is permissible to perform a good act that has bad consequences, if certain other conditions hold. Those conditions are: 1) the bad effect is proportional to the desired military objective 2) the bad effect is unintended, 3) the bad effect is not a direct means to the good effect and 4) soldiers are obligated to take actions to minimize the foreseeable bad effects resulting from any course of action, even if it means accepting an increased risk to soldiers.

If one cannot engage in war without harming noncombatants one cannot be morally prohibited from doing so and morally permitted to go to war. Thus, if the US fights the war on terrorism in accordance with the war model, its soldiers may engage in courses of action in which noncombatants may be harmed as a result. This harm, however, must only be incidental and they may not use it as means to achieve their ends. Further, they must reduce the harm to the greatest extent possible given the considerations of risk outlined above.

While wars are fought to establish peace, criminals are pursued to preserve it. Thus, with criminals, the act of aggression is not against the state, but against individuals or groups of individuals within the state. Thus, such acts may represent a breach of peace, but not a destruction of it. If the only morally appropriate use of force in war is to restore peace, then the only morally appropriate use of force in peace is to preserve it.

Thus it is not permissible to violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of another nation in order to pursue criminals since there has been no act of aggression by a state to warrant it.

Since the use of force represents to some degree an absence of peace, it makes no sense to use any more force than is necessary. But for, police, unlike soldiers, necessary is understood as using only the least force possible, not the most force permissible. This is because police maintain, rather than establish peace. Thus, it does not make sense for police officers to breach the peace in order to maintain it. If a sniper were firing from a building that contained civilians, we would not likely claim that the police were morally permitted to use the maximum force allowable under the doctrine of double effect. Even if a sniper were likely to kill several people if he were allowed to remain in the building, it would still not be permissible to destroy the building if by doing so innocent people would be killed. Even in extreme cases, police are obligated to try every possible course of action that preclude civilian casualties before they would be morally permitted to engage in a course of action that could potentially lead to civilian casualties. [15] But, from the standpoint of the law and morality of war, this just is not the case.

This is not to say that police are prohibited from taking some risks that might place civilian lives in danger. For example, police are permitted to engage in high-speed pursuits even though such pursuits can and have resulted in accidents in which innocent bystanders have been killed. The difference is police are not permitted to engage in such pursuits, or any other activity in which they know civilians will be killed or seriously injured. [16] But, as discussed above, there are many conditions under which such actions would be permissible for soldiers.

Thus if it were only permissible to pursue terrorists as criminals, then it would never be permissible to violate the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of another nation in order to do so. This would be a breach of peace far in excess of what criminal activity warrants. Furthermore, it would never be permissible to do so in a way that civilians will knowingly be harmed.

While both models have their merits, they are inadequate to account for the moral nuances of this conflict. The terrorists who struck the United States on September 11 have the intent and capacity to negate the American way of life. The fact that they are actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction only underscores this point. Thus, they are in a very real sense, enemies. However, their acts of violence do not represent an act of aggression by a state, and thus committing an act of aggression against another state is problematic.

Certainly the terrorists are responsible and should be brought to justice if possible, or destroyed if necessary. But the real question is to what degree is the US and its allies permitted to engage in courses of action that violate the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of other nations. If such actions are permissible, then it also needs to be determined to what extent it is permissible to harm noncombatants in the process.

If the criminal model were correct, the answer to these questions would be “never.” Criminals may only be pursued within the framework of law. As Noam Chomsky points out, “When IRA bombs were set off in London, there was no call to bomb West Belfast, or Boston, the source of much of the financial support for the IRA. Rather, steps were taken to apprehend the criminals, and efforts were made to deal with what lay behind the resort to terror.” [17] In this view, to pursue the terrorists under the war model would itself be an act of terror.

But this objection misses the point. Terrorists are more like criminals in organisation, but more like enemies in terms of goals and methods. Terrorists attempt to achieve political goals by means of instilling terror in civilian populations. [18] But it is not the goals of the terrorists that are at issue here. Nor is it relevant whether the terrorists intend to negate any nation or other group’s way of life. What is relevant is the method. By instilling terror into civilian populations terrorist groups negate in a very important way the community they target. It is their actions that turn more or less free, open, and secure societies into to closed and fearful ones. [19] Whether or not they actually achieve this goal is irrelevant, the fact that it is their goal is what makes them enemies.

Thus Chomsky’s objection is question begging. Though there were in fact no calls to bomb Boston that does not necessarily entail that British authorities are not permitted to consider it should it be the only way they can reach the terrorists. But it does entail Chomsky is half right. For the US to hold its position consistently, it must accept that it is morally obligated to cooperate fully with British authorities in apprehending members of the IRA and eliminating their sources of support. Thus, rather than underscoring the need for restraint, recent events underscore the need to intensify efforts to eliminate terrorists and their support bases, even if that support base is in Boston.

I am not arguing however, that Britain, should, in any sense of the word, bomb Boston or West Belfast. [20] Britain has jurisdiction over West Belfast; thus it would make no sense to bomb it. What justifies the use of force against terrorists is the obligation of the state to protect its citizens. It makes no sense to violate this obligation in order to preserve it. Thus within one’s own borders it would be immoral to pursue terrorists in a way civilians will knowingly be harmed. [21] Furthermore, as long as British authorities enjoy the full cooperation of US authorities in eliminating sources of support for the IRA in the United States, Britain would not be permitted to violate the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the US in their pursuit. In the case that they do not enjoy such cooperation, then practical limits will be more restrictive than the moral ones.

But the Al-Qaeda network operates and receives support from people in a number of nations, including the United States. Thus in places where the US has jurisdiction or the complete cooperation of the nations in question, it must pursue them as criminals. To do otherwise puts unnecessary risks on noncombatants. But it is important to recall in war that the need to minimize risk is limited by the need to defeat the enemy. Thus in places where that cooperation does not exist, as in Taliban controlled Afghanistan, then the kind of threat they represent warrants the kind of response one reserves for the enemy. In this case, war is permissible.

In this latter case, it also follows that US forces are permitted to pursue terrorists in such a way that noncombatants may be harmed, though this harm must be limited by the doctrine of double effect. A recent article in the Los Angeles Times states that fear of civilian casualties paralyzed military leaders and restrained their actions. Paradoxically, the article points out, this may have led to a lengthening of the war, since this feared prohibited the US from acting as aggressively as it wanted to. The article goes on to point out that “some charge that obsessive attention to safeguarding civilians has undermined military effectiveness, fueled interservice rivalries and hurt morale. Worse, these officials say, it has increased the likelihood of AL Qaeda chieftans escaping because of its pervasive influence on US strategy.” [22]

While this concern is legitimate, the fact that military leaders permitted fear of civilian casualties to so adversely affect morale as well as operations suggest there is a great deal of confusion over what is morally obligated. As this analysis points out, members of the military must take great care to minimize risk and harm to noncombatants, even if it means taking additional risks. But those risks are mitigated by the need to accomplish the mission, which is turn mitigated by the importance of the mission to the war effort. It is wrong to destroy a whole village to kill one leader, especially if by doing so one is not appreciably closer to ending the war. But one is permitted to destroy a command center or a training camp, even if civilians will be harmed.

This is where means and ends both matter. When applying the doctrine of double effect, what is permissible as collateral damage does in an important way depend on the kind of weapons available. If there is a way to kill terrorists and destroy their facilities without killing noncombatants, military leaders are obligated to take it. But if such means are not available, military leaders are permitted to use less precise means as long as the doctrine of double effect is adhered to. This means first that the destruction done to civilian lives and property must be less than the good done by destroying the military target. Second, this destruction must be unintentional, that is one cannot target a village in order to get the Al Qaeda members inside. One must have the means to target the leaders themselves such that any resultant civilian deaths are incidental. Third, it follows that one may not use the deaths of noncombatants as means to further the war effort. For example, even though killing noncombatants may make it more difficult for Al Qaeda members to evade capture it is still very wrong to do so. Fourth extra risks are taken, if necessary, to minimize the harm to noncombatants. This means the most precise weapons available must be used, even if that means putting soldiers on the ground. One cannot wage modern war without harming civilians, but as long as the doctrine of double effect is observed to the greatest extent humanly possible, the fault of those deaths lie with the aggressor.

Because the terrorists are organized more like criminals, they are able to take advantage of the opportunities to conceal their activities within civil society. Because of this, nations risk doing a lot more harm than good if they are pursued as enemies. But when it is not possible to pursue them as criminals, it is permissible to pursue them as enemies.

Other Questions: There is not space here to discuss all the issues raised by the War against Terrorism. Nonetheless, the analysis above does raise some questions that need to be addressed. What follows is an attempt to raise some of those questions and suggest directions in which they may be resolved.

One problem with this analysis is that it has the potential to cause ethical problems for certain other nations. States, in order to fulfill their obligations must preserve the orderliness of civil society. But in many places, Pakistan being a prime example, the government cooperates with the US at great risk. Because of perceived injustices committed by the US, many populations hold a deep resentment and cooperation with the US may lead to instability. Thus, states, like Pakistan, that wish to cooperate raise a legitimate objection when they are not able to do so fully, at least if “fully” means acceding to every US demand.

Since the justification for US military action abroad rests in part in its obligation to protect its citizens, it only makes sense that it respect the same obligation that other states have. Protecting citizens does not just entail responding to external threats, it also means maintaining an orderly civil society. This means that the US is obligated to take the domestic concerns of the nations involved into account when deciding on courses of action. Complete cooperation does not necessarily entail meeting every demand US authorities make. Thus it would not be permissible to commit an act of aggression against states that make a good faith effort to cooperate with the US, even if that good faith is limited by domestic concerns. How to tell if other nations are acting in good faith or how to tell what demands are reasonable is another matter.

But, President Bush has unequivocally stated that nations are either allies of the United States or enemies. And in spite of a great deal of criticism both at home and abroad, there is some point to his remarks. If a government is not supporting terrorists, then it should not have anything to lose by either aiding the US fight or at least granting it sufficient access within its borders to do so itself. But as noted before, political realities may make it so every government may not be able to cooperate in the way the US demands. Thus, though the rhetoric he used does not leave much middle ground it will do a great deal of good to determine what obligations allied and neutral states have to nations subject to terrorist attack and vice versa.

Furthermore, this analysis suggests there will be a difference between how a nation subject to terrorist attack should respond if the terrorism is state-sponsored terrorism or simply state-tolerated. Furthermore, it is occasionally the case that some governments may wish to eliminate terrorists operating within its borders, but cannot. This same government may also not be able to permit US forces into the country due to domestic political considerations. In the case of state sponsored and state tolerated terrorist activities the governments are in some way responsible and it makes sense to hold them as such. [23] But in the case of dysfunctional states, where law enforcement institutions do not exist or are incapable of handling the terrorist threat, moral obligations, permissions, and prohibitions may be different.

Another question left unanswered is the status of terrorists in the course of attacking and apprehending them. Because they are enemies there is no moral obligation to use deadly force as a last resort, as is the case when pursuing criminals, even violent ones. However, even enemy soldiers enjoy the right to benevolent quarantine when they surrender. Furthermore, enemy soldiers may not, for reasons mentioned above, be forced to stand trial for the crime of the war itself and upon the end of hostilities must be repatriated.

However, the offense of the terrorist is the method by which they choose to wage war, not the cause itself. Thus, even if their cause is just, they are still criminals and thus do not enjoy the protections that POWs enjoy. However, one cannot have it both ways. Once apprehended they do enjoy at least some of the rights a criminal would enjoy. What those are exactly need to be determined. At a minimum, it would suggest that a trial at some point would be necessary to meet out an appropriate punishment.

Conclusion

In the course of responding to the terrorists’ act of aggression it will be important that we solve the ethical issues raised by this new kind of conflict as well as the practical ones. It will not be sufficient just to be powerful, it will also be necessary to be right. This does not mean that the US should restrain its efforts in fighting this war. But it does mean that those prosecuting this war must remember the United States is a member of a community of nations and that there are obligations to citizens in other states, even ones which support the terrorists, that must be observed. One cannot rationally fight evil by committing it. Thus when political and military leaders ask themselves the question, "what should we do?" they need to consider both the pragmatic and moral aspects of this word. Certainly, in the midst of our justifiable anger we must take care not to become like the enemy we fight. This is also no time to go bungee jumping off the moral highground.

[1] For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that this obligation exists. There is a great deal of discussion regarding the nature and source of this justification that do not bear on the discussion here.

[2] Many military thinkers agree that the US military is facing a new kind of conflict, which most refer to as Fourth Generation or Asymmetric Warfare (See www.dni.net for an excellent source of resources and publications). In response to this threat, they argue that the military needs to radically revamp its current weapon systems and doctrine in order to adequately respond to it. The question this paper will address is the need to also reconsider its ethical assumptions.

[3] Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Rise of Complex Terrorism,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2002, p. 54

[4] Noam Chomsky, 9-11New York: Seven Stories Press, 2001, p. 15

[5] Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 49.

[8] Some Just War Theorists, like Michael Walzer, argue that one may attack an enemy if the threat of aggression commits as much harm as the actual a preemptive strike may be permitted. He argues that in the case of the Six Day War the mass of Egyptian Forces on the Israeli border so stressed the Israeli economy because it diverted precious resources to the purpose of defense, Israel had no choice but to attack. See Just and Unjust Wars, New York: Basic Books, 1977, Chapter 5 Anticipations.

[9] The use of the word “force” throughout this paper is synonymous with “deadly force.” For the sake of simplicity, and unless otherwise stated, I am not considering uses of force that do not have the potential to kill or seriously injure someone.

[10] The way moral and legal considerations shape the use of force is quite complex. While moral and legal considerations do limit the misery caused by war, this does not always (though it does usually) entail limiting the amount of force a soldier should apply. For a more detailed discussion, see Tony Pfaff, Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2000, Appendix A.

[11] James M. Dubik, “Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer’s Just War Theory,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 11, no. 4 (1982): 355.

[12] This has been, in fact, a feature of the Taliban strategy against the US. By placing military equipment and other military targets in the vicinity of civilian populations they hoped to compromise US attacks by turning public opinion against them. In such instances, it is necessary to point out whose actions put the noncombatants at risk. Thus the blame for their deaths rests on them.

[13] Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, 2^nd ed., Trenton, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999, p. 93.

[15] John Kleinig, The Ethics of Policing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 118-122. See also Pfaff, 13-20.

[18] There is a great deal of debate regarding what the best definition of a terrorist is. Andrew Valls argues that it is improper to define terrorism in a way that prejudges it. By defining it as attacking civilian populations with the intent to instill fear, one is defining it as morally wrong since attacking civilian populations indiscriminately is wrong. Vall’s prefers to define terrorism as a form of political violence to achieve political goals, where creating fear is usually high among the intended effects. Given this definition, terrorism is not by definition wrong. If terrorists simply try to instill fear in military populations by limiting attacks to military targets, they have done nothing that violates jus in bello. I would agree that such terrorists do not warrant the same kind of reaction that the US is undertaking in Afghanistan. However, when discussing the current War against Terrorism, it makes sense to accept the former definition since, by their actions, the terrorists the US and its allies are fighting do in fact indiscriminately attack civilian populations. See “Can Terrorism be Justified,” Ethics in International Affairs, Andrew Valls ed., Lanham Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc, p. 67.

[19] By using the language of free, open, secure societies I am not suggesting that only Western-like democracies are permitted to treat terrorists as enemies. I take it as fact that whatever social arrangement people have entered will be fundamentally altered in a negative way by acts of terror. So long as people are willing to defend this social arrangement, they are permitted to do so.

[20] Chomsky also wonders why there were no calls to bomb Idaho and Michigan in response to the bombing of the Federal Center in Oklahoma. This kind of argument is specious and unhelpful in the current debate. As the discussion indicates, it is not inconsistent to pursue threats at home, where one has jurisdiction, as criminals and certain threats abroad as enemies.

[21] One possible counter-example may be if terrorists were about to detonate a weapon of mass destruction and one could only prevent this by bombing the neighborhood where the terrorists placed the weapon. In this case, the threat represented by the weapon may justify such action. See Pfaff, p. 16-17.

[22] William Arkin, Fear of Civilian Deaths May Have Undermined Effort, Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2002.

Ethics and the War on Terrorism

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Conclusion